Friday, 9 September 2011

Osama Bin Laden

In the "martyrs of the missing," Charles Kurzman suggests that even before the killing of Osama bin Laden and his movement has completely failed. The trademark of al Qaeda ideology is to urge Muslims to engage in ordinary acts of individual violence against those deemed enemies of Islam, and specifically Americans, Jews and infidels, the rulers of the Muslim-majority countries. So far, such attacks have occurred the very few in the United States since September 11, and certainly nothing comparable to the devastating events of that day. Stressed how surprising is this, cites Kurzman 2006 online guide to the Mujahideen aspiring lists the 14 "simple tools" that "is easy to use and available to anyone who wants to fight the occupying enemy" - which includes "Run more than one person is infected. Car" and "ignite fire in the houses or rooms at bedtime "Kurzman, a sociologist who has written extensively about Muslim reform movements, and asks:" If terrorist tactics to be available widely for cars, why are there so few Islamic terrorists? in the light of the death and destruction caused by terrorists, the question may seem absurd. But if there is more than a billion Muslims in the world, many of whom hate the supposed death of the Western and the desire, why do not we see the terrorist attacks in every place, every day?
Kurzman answer is that al Qaeda and violent sons have failed miserably so simply because they can not attract large numbers of recruits to their cause. Recognize the opinion polls show that concern a large proportion of Muslims in the world (outside the U.S.) was approved by bin Laden. In his opinion, however, should be understood such feelings is not as showing the actual with the tactics of al Qaeda and methods, it is evidence that bin Laden and his group were a form of "radical Sheikh." By this, Kurzman means that al Qaeda has become a symbol of anti-imperialism and Islamic authenticity and thumbing of the nose and one in the political system in which the brutality of many Arabs and Muslims to live. In fact, many of those who express approval of bin Laden in the opinion polls also show enthusiasm for pop music or political democracy - both anathema to al Qaeda.
The passage of time has alienated most of the Muslims of al Qaeda, for a number of reasons. Perhaps most important is to kill large numbers of Muslims in the terror campaigns. These killings of a taboo in Islamic law, and the efforts of al Qaeda legitimacy of whom have had little success. Most Muslims reject the divinity of al Qaeda, a malignant form of Salafism, a strict or literal approach to texts and revealed that the trademark if their fellow Muslims infidels were not pure enough in their beliefs and practices. This theology gives al-Qaida quality orientation, which prevents from becoming a mass movement, although it is not clear that it aspires to become one of the ever: the vanguard of declared al-Qaeda describes its members as "outsiders", in reference to a few Muslims who will remain true to his religion at the end of time.
Kurzman also notes that al Qaeda had to deal with competition from other Islamic groups, and ideologies, including local movements that do not have the global agenda. Hamas and the Taliban may espouse violence and Islamic radicalism, but they have little interest in attacking the West, and their interpretations of Islam and often come into conflict with the leader of al Qaeda. (In contrast, bin Laden's media savvy, and Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar, did not allow filming itself.) Equally important, Al Qaeda is facing competition from Islamic groups that combine a liberal, at least some measure of support for political democracy with the culturally conservative views views on women's role and scope of Islamic law.
While the book is Kurzman contribution to the study of al-Qaeda and Islam, one is very selective. Point of view of provocation that there are a lot of "martyrs of the missing" - that there is, in fact, "the terrorists Muslim, very few" - if it makes sense, and only one focuses narrowly on the United States and not, for example, in Iraq or Afghanistan or Pakistan. Conducted many of them people of these countries have suffered from terrorist attacks daily in the name of the ideology of al Qaeda for a decade at least, by the suicide bombers who were abundant. For Iraqis, and provides statistics Kurzman - "Islamic terrorists the world has managed to recruit fewer than one in 15,000 Muslims over the past quarter century, and less than one in 100,000 Muslims since 9 / 11" - provide little comfort. Calculus through this we are talking about more than 10,000 people. Any other terrorist phenomenon that compares in size.

No comments:

Post a Comment